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A SURVEY OF THE WORK DONE BY THE BIO-SYSTEMS GROUP 
OF THE CONTROL SYSTEMS LABORATORY
The Bio-Systems was constituted as one of the original divisions 
of the Control Systems Laboratory early in 1951. It is scheduled to be 
disbanded in February 1956. During these five years the Bio-Systems 
Group has always been small but has had an ambitious and largely basic 
research program.
During three summers, 1951, 1952, 1953, the group was greatly 
reinforced by a large number of consultants staying anywhere from three 
days to two months. In the summer of 1954 the group arranged a one-week 
symposium at Allerton Park. During 1954 and 1955 the group cooperated 
with members of the Statistical Research Center of the University of 
Chicago in studying the sampling distribution of information functionals.
A - Bio-Systems
Our group first engaged in a study of living systems in which we 
considered them as very complex, self-checking and self-maintaining automata. 
The informational performance of even the most simple living system is 
tremendous, compared to that of the most complex existing technological 
information-handling devices. This performance is achieved in a poorly 
controlled environment under conditions technologically unacceptable for 
precision work. Yet, it somehow works. It is very unlikely that the 
performance is based on high reliability of components. Instead, it is 
virtually certain that living things can do what they do because of a 
very successful design. It was hoped that a methodological study of 
living things might yield some ideas of the design principles involved.
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It was assumed that the modern mathematical systems theories - such as theory 
of information and communication, cybernetics, game theory, and other’s would 
provide appropriate concepts for such analysis.
The following documents were prepared in the course of this study:
(i) "Biological Control Systems" -- 27 essays by 25 authors 
collected during the summer session of 1951. This collection has 
been made available in multilith copies, as a report of 560 pages.
(ii) "Essays on the use of Information Theory in Biology" -- 19 
essays by 15 authors, a book of 273 pages published by the University 
of Illinois Press in 1953. The material was largely prepared during 
the summer session of 1952. This volume was issued at a time when
it had already been decided that the Bio-Systems Group would greatly 
reduce its activities in this field and it was hoped that the 
published account of our endeavours would arouse interest and 
stimulate work along the same lines at other places. This hope 
has been fulfilled to some degree.
(ii;L) "Essays on Biological Unitization" -- CSL Report R-52 
(1953) of 73 pages, containing 6 papers by 6 authors. The main 
feature of this report is the sketching out of a new kind of analysis 
of biological control systems. One may expect to find material for 
interesting further generalization, if about a dozen more systems 
are analyzed in a similar fashion.
(iv) K. S. Tweedell, "Redundancy in Living Organisms: Fertility 
vs. Brood Care" -- CSL report R-47 (1954). A continuation of an
investigation reported in the book on Information Theory in Biology.
3B - Man-Machine Systems
From 1952 to 1953 the Bio-Systems Group gradually shifted from a 
v e r y  general consideration of information processing systems to the study 
of systems which are much less successful but easier to approach and of 
more immediate practical importance. We turned to a study of information 
processing by human teams. It appears that many systems of military 
interest will evolve into organizations of the following type:
4One critical sub-system in such a system is the one labelled 
monitoring and correcting". This is an activity which is expected to be 
under human supervision. The total flow of information through this 
component will be considerably greater than the capacity of a single man. 
Accordingly, an organization is needed; it appears to be of considerable 
importance to discover rational principles which can be used to design 
such organizations.
We have not gone far in this direction, for reasons which will be 
explained in the following section. The following reports, all prepared 
by summer consultants, deal with this phase of our activities:
(v) "A Note on the Spread of Rumor or Epidemic". J. B. Keller 
and J. Shmoys, 1954, CSL report R-48.
(vi) "A Note on Equations for a Class of Interaction Problems".
R. Duncan Luce, 1954, CSL report R-55.
(vi-O "Empirical Entropy: A Study of Information Flow in Air 
Traffic Control". E. L. Fritz and G. W. Grier, 1954, CSL report R-54.
(viii) "Suggestions for the Analysis of Reaction Times and 
jimple Choice Behavior". Lee S. Christie and R. Duncan Luce, 1954,
CSL report R-53.
C - Human Information Processing
i
In approaching the problem of information processing by human 
teams, it turned out very quickly that not nearly enough was known about 
the properties of the basic component of such systems, namely, a single man 
processing information. Accordingly, the Bio-Systems Group concentrated 
on studies in the realm of applied psychology. They constitute the main 
body of work done by the group. We have attempted to obtain rational
5estimates of human information-processing capabilities, using the modern 
theoretical concepts of information theory and related specialities.
We feel that we have largely succeeded in defining human information­
processing capabilities for some simple situations, and that we have out­
lined an approach which should work for more complex information-processing 
of the kind which is demanded from a man operating in a man-machine system. 
Some of the results which follow are also outlined in the other two 
papers of this report.
The following reports were prepared in the course of this activity:
(ix) "Human Performance in Information Transmission, Part I;
General Remarks, Part II; Sequential Tasks". H. Quastler and
V. Wulff, Feb. 1955, CSL report R-62.
(x) "Human Performance in Information Transmission, Part III;
Scale Reading". J. W. Osborne, H. Quastler and K. S. Tweedell,
Oct. 1955, CSL report R-68.
(xi) "Human Performance in Information Transmission, Part IV;
Flash Recognition of Letters and Cards". L. Augenstine, et al.,
1956, CSL report R-69.
(xii) "Human Performance in Information Transmission, Part
V: The Force of Habit". B. Brabb and H. Quastler, 1956,
CSL report R-70.
(xiii) "Human Performance in Information Transmission, Part
VIj— Evidence of Periodicity". L. Augenstine, 1956, CSL report R-75.
(xiv) A Survey Lecture on "Studies of Human Channel Capacity".
given at the 3rd London Symposiums on Information Theory. It will
6be published in the proceeding of that symposium, and is included 
in this report. (R-71, 1956).
(xv) An essay on "Informational Limitations of Decision Making” , 
a sketch of the expected manner in which our results could be applied 
to more complex human activities. This essay also is included in 
this report (R-71, 1956).
(xvi) "Information Theory in Psychology: Problems and Methods".
A book of 428 pages, containing 30 articles by 23 authors, published 
by the Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, (January 20, 1956). The content 
of this book is largely made up of the proceedings of the summer 
conference of 1954 at Allerton Park.
(xvii) "A Study of Human Performance in Filtering Information".
The report of an experimental investigation performed in cooperation
with members of the Systems Analysis Branch of the Naval Research 
Laboratory. This report will be issued early in 1956. H. Quastler
(xviii) A review article to be published in the Yale Scientific 
Review. L. Augenstine and H. Quastler.
D - Applied Mathematics
In the course of making experimental studies of human information 
processing it was found that existing methods of computing information 
measures were often not adequate for our purposes. A parallel situation 
was found in studying evidence of periodicity. Accordingly, the Bio-Systems 
Group undertook some investigations in applied mathematics.
The following documents were prepared in connection with this activity:
(xix) "Note on Information Entropy for Quantized Normal
7Distribution". A. A. Blank, Hay 1953, CSL report R-40.
(xx) "Notes on the Estimation of Information Measures". A.A. 
Blank and H. Quastler, 1954, CSL report R-56. A survey of several 
approximation and bracketting methods to estimate information 
measures under favorable conditions.
(xxi) Informal notes on a Session of Information Theory 
which was held during a meeting of the American Institute of 
Mathematical Statistics in the fall of 1955 at Ann Arbor,
Michigan. Three papers were given at that meeting by B. McMillan, 
D. Slepian, and H. David. A multilith copy of the manuscript is 
available; however, it does not constitute a formal report.
(xxii) "Sampling Distribution of Information Functions".
This describes work done in conjunction with members of the 
Statistical Research Center of the University of Chicago
(K. Brownlee, H. David and W. Kruskal) using the digital computer 
of the University of Illinois. One or two reports will be issued 
early in 1956 (R-76).
(xxiii) "Empirical Sampling Fluctuations of Information 
Measures". L. Augenstine and H. Quastler. The Sampling 
Distribution found empirically is roughly the same as that which 
would be predicted on the basis of simple multinomial sampling. 
This report will be issued early in 1956 (R-77).
(xxiv) "Sampling Distribution of Autocorrelation and Power 
Spectrum Functions". L. Augenstine. These functions were
designed to detect sinusoidal-type periodicities. It was hoped
that they could be adapted to the analysis of non-sinusoidal 
periodicities. Monte Carlo methods were used in a limited 
investigation of the dependence of the above functions on the 
sample size and the wave form. This report will be issued early 
in 1956 (R-78).
(xxv) "Elements of Applied Information Theory". H. Quastler.
In connection with doing experimental research using information 
theory, the group acquired some experience in teaching the applications 
of information theory. A text book, based on this experience will 
be issued as a Technical Memorandum by 00R, early in 1956.
CONCLUSION
It is our feeling that the work of the Bio-Systems Group has been 
brought to at least partial completion. We have produced proof of 
feasibility that human behaviour information-processing can be subjected 
to rational analysis with the help of modern theoretical approaches. This 
result could not be used in attacking our earlier problems of information 
processing by human teams. Finally, we feel that we have made some progress, 
especially methodologically, toward our first goal, the analysis of 
complicated automata.
9STUDIES OF HUMAN CHANNEL CAPACITY*
In this paper, we will discuss strategies of studying the factors 
which limit human channel capacity; sketch three typical experimental 
studies, give a descriptive catalog of factors known to limit human 
information transmission; and finally, mention possibilities of further 
development.
EMPIRICAL CHANNEL CAPACITY
Channel Capacity" is a function which can be rigorously determined 
for well-defined channels. In dealing with man, a channel which is poorly 
known, poorly controlled, and has an enormous range of possible inputs 
and outputs, the rigorous method is not practical. So, one is reduced to 
a direct empirical approach. This involves a modern variant of time- 
motion studies with "amount of information transmitted" in the role of the 
commodity produced. The results of such studies will be peak rates of 
observed information transmission, not true channel capacities in the 
rigorous technical sense. Such values have the nature of records — not 
in the sense of outstanding individual performances, but rather referring 
to the experimenter's ability to find conditions under which individuals 
of good but not extraordinary competence can transmit information at 
high rates. We claim that these empirical channel capacities are the 
best available estimates of true channel capacities, and that they remain 
valid estimates until higher transmission rates are actually achieved in 
a reproducible fashion.
Man’s capability of transmitting information is limited by what
* Lecture given at the 3rd London Conference on Information Theory, Sept. 
1955. It is reproduced here with the permission of the Buttercroth 
Scientific Press, publishers of the complete proceedings of the conference.
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inputs he can receive, what outputs he can generate, and to what degree he 
can lawfully associate inputs with outputs. Man is a highly non-linear 
channel, subject to several partly interacting limitations. We study all 
limitations in terms of transmission rates. This does not mean that they 
must have the character of a channel capacity; limiting factors of various 
other types have been encountered in experiments.
If we want to study ultimate limitations, we have to use situations
where information transmission is at its best. It is quite obvious that
in most actual situations transmission rates will be much below the highest
rates obtainable. Some conditions for high transmission rates are: the
stimuli must be easily perceived and discriminated, and the responses
easily executed. All compatibilities must be good (not only stimulus-
response compatibility, but also stimulus-stimulus and response-response
compatibility ). The subject should be competent, and thoroughly
familiar with his task; he must understand what he is to do, and be
properly motivated; he must be allowed to organize his activities in the
best fashion. The task chosen must be such that a large fraction of the
subject s effort goes into measurable information transmission. All this
makes considerable demands on the experimenter's skill and patience; most
of the test performances in the standard repetoire of the psychological
laboratory can not, and do not, approach peak rates. It seems that 
13Licklider was the first to study human transmission under near-optimum 
conditions; up to now, he has not had very many followers.
Suppose an observer has measured a certain rate of information 
transmission; the conditions being favorable, he may suspect that the 
observed performance is near optimum. In order to test it, one must first
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ascertain that the limitations are central and not on the input or output
side. Input limitations can be excluded if it can be shown that the
subject can handle more detailed inputs if the information content is
reduced by using highly redundant inputs. Similarly, output limitations
can be excluded if it can be shown that the output can be increased if
the informational demands are reduced, for instance, by rehearsing the
performance. Next, one should try to vary the informational challenge
(input information) and see how the subject responds. Typically, one
observes that small challenges are answered with perfect transmission;
as the challenge increases progressively, errors become increasingly
frequent; very heavy challenges lead to a breakdown of transmission
( confusion effect ). If the transmission rate is plotted on the same
scale as the input information, then a curve results which begins as a
straight line rising under a 45° angle, turns smoothly into a plateau
or a flat maximum, and declines again. Only when one has observed
the peak of the curve can he confidently assert that he has reached the
peak value with respect to the particular mode of challenge investigated.
The informational challenge can be varied in a number of ways:: by varying
the speed, the precision requirement, information content per single act,
logon content, etc. Only when one has challenged in a variety of modes
can he feel confident of having approximated the peak value for the 
1 17 20 21activity studied. ’ ’ ’
In most cases so far studied, the peak transmission rate was 
found to occur at a stage when the subjects made a few errors, and was 
only slightly larger than the transmission rate associated with the best 
error-free performance. However, this experience had to come out of
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studies in which subjects were pushed way beyond the limit of error-free 
performance; a similarly exhaustive study will be needed in every radically 
new situation. This involves the estimation of information transmission 
in the presence of many errors. Basically, this is no problem; but it 
entails considerable practical difficulties. The estimation of 
transmission rates depends on estimating the probabilities for all input- 
output combinations. In psychological experiments, there may be very 
many such combinations; in fact, there always are when conditions are 
favorable for high transmission rates. For instance, in a letter-recognition 
experiment, there are 26 possible inputs and as many outputs, or 676 
stimulus-response pairs - not taking into account inter-symbol influences.
In order to obtain a probability measure for each category, very large 
samples will be needed, which leads to an inordinate amount of labor in 
gathering and processing data. Moreover, during a long series of trials 
the underlying conditional probabilities will change. Thus, it is 
essential to develop approximating shortcuts which reduce the number of 
probabilities which must be estimated and, thus, the sample size2’2Zf.
The more such shortcuts an investigator has at his disposal, the more 
likely he will be to find one appropriate for a particular situation 
studied. Even so, sampling fluctuations of information functions present 
a serious problem. Miller and others have given asymptotic formulae for 
the sampling distributions which yield good estimates of the first and 
second moment of the distribution even for small sample sizes. However, 
their performance is poor for the tails of the distributions which 
determine the confidence intervals, and these are what the experimenter 
needs. So, a team was formed consisting of 3 statisticians, 2
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experimenters and one high-speed digital computer, in order to investigate 
complete, sampling distributions with the help of Monte Carlo methods.
With this procedure, particular experiments can be tested in a straight­
forward manner; one just explores various likely or possible probability 
sets, and investigates directly the associated sampling distributions.
We also considered producing a table of various characteristics values, 
but, it turned out that this table would have to be very large. There­
fore, we returned to the search for analytic approximation of the 
sampling distributions. As of now, the best approximation is one 
developed by H. T. David ; it is very nearly normal up to the 5% tails 
with samples as small as 11 or 31. The work is not finished and we 
hope to find still better functions.
EXAMPLES OF EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES
In the preceding section, we have stated what we consider the
proper strategy for experiments on human channel capacity. We know of
no group of experiments which fulfills all of our postulates, including,
alas, the work done in the author's laboratory. We do have, however,
several experiments which do not fall very short of our goal. Three
of them will be briefly sketched here.
A - A Study of a Sequential Activity; Piano Playing
We have investigated rates of information transmitted in playing 
21piano . In order to be sure about the information input, we let the 
subjects sight-read "nonsense" sequences of notes, constructed with a 
table of random numbers. After some pilot tests, we chose as our 
experimental music a single-voice line, with constant rhythm, using
14
various "alphabets" from 3 to 65 keys, each key being given equal
it
probability . The tests were done with three professional pianists.
They were familiarized with the task; then, successive samples of about 
100 notes each were presented at gradually increasing speed, coaxing 
the subjects into greater and greater speed until they were obviously 
way beyond their capabilities. In this manner, all alphabets were 
worked through
In general, subjects made very few errors up to a certain speed, 
the transmission rate increasing proportional to the speed. Then, the 
error rate increased. Soon, proportional trading of speed for precision 
was established so that the transmission rate remained approximately 
constant. At extreme speeds, the performance deteriorated rapidly 
('confusion effect"). Individual differences were small.
The results can be summarized as follows (Table): the performance
is limited by an effective range of about 50 keys, an effective speed of 
about 5.2 keys/sec, or a transmission rate of about 22 bits/sec, whichever 
imposes the lowest limits; if the challenge in one direction (speed or 
range) is very small, then the performance in the other is somewhat higher
* Attempts to increase information transmission by utilizing additional 
dimensions (2 or 4 voices, added text, added chords, added rhythm) 
failed; they resulted in compensatory or worse than compensatory 
slow-down. We probably could have improved the transmission rate a 
little by using various intervals with unequal frequencies, according 
to their relative difficulty.
21** In similar tests with typewriting , we used two alternatives methods 
of challenging: increasing speed with constant alphabet, and increasing 
alphabet sizes at constant speed. The results were the same.
15
than in the neighborhood of the peak transmission rate ("simple challenge 
effect"); if the challenge is extremely high, then transmission rate 
drops below the optimum ("confusion effect"). It is important to note 
that the limitations of information transmission differ, depending 
on the conditions used; hence, studies performed in different restricted 
domains would have yielded apparent contradictions.
Table: Piano Tests 
(average values)
Size of Highest Effective Speed Transmission rate RemarksAlphabet* (keys / sec) (bits/sec)
3
\ 6.5 10 | Simple Challenge4 13 J Effect
5 >t ‘ 10 j Speed9 IV 5.2 16 1^ Limitation15 J 19 J1
25 4.9 23 1 Channel37 4.4 22 J Capacity
65 2.8 17 Range Limitation
Number of keys used; repetitions being excluded, the number of 
équiprobable alternatives is one less than this number.
** The no. of keys per second which, if executed flawlessly, would yield 
the peak transmission rate.
B “ A Study of a Single-Act Performance: Scale Reading 
We repeated and generalized Garner and Hake's classical experiment8 
on how much information can be acquired, in a single glance, about the 
position of a pointer on a scale. We modified their arrangement by using 
a strip of squares instead of a scale, and a brightly colored marker
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instead of a pointer17. Furthermore, we gave the subject redundant information 
by coloring every other square, and by using different colors for whole regions 
of white and colored squares. So assisted, subjects can assimilate 4.3 bits 
of information at a glance, i.e., they effectively discriminate about 20 
squares in a strip. This rate is reached with strips of 24 squares.
Next, we displayed simultaneously two strips of 24 squares, with one 
marker on each; this yielded 5.2 bits of information. Three strips and 3 
markers gave only 5.6 bits. This low value suggested that the number of 
squares which is optimum for a single strip is not the best for multiple 
strips (due to the confusion effect). This was confirmed in a comprehensive 
study in which we used from 3 to 24 squares per strip, and raised the number 
of strips in each case beyond the saturation point (using up to 12 strips).
With fewer squares per strips, subjects can easily transmit 7 1/2 bits from 
3 scales. The limitations found were: subjects can assimilate the 
equivalent of up to 5 1/2 squares per strip, and the equivalent of up to
5 1/2 strips perfectly discriminated. There is no limitation which has the
^ - . 
character of a channel capacity : the limiting factors are logon content
(number of strips) and span of absolute judgment ’ conjunctively^, i.e.,
whichever imposes the lower limit is effective. These limitations are
valid in the neighborhood of optimum performance; there is a simple-challenge
effect if only one or two strips are used; we presume that a similar effect
would be obtained by minimizing the challenge in the other mode, using only
2 squares per strip.
* The total amount of information assimilated in this experiment is not 
a maximum for a single-glance performance; higher values have been 
obtained with letters, playing cards, and combinations of letters and dials.
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C - A Comparative Study of Disjunctive Reaction and Sequential
Activity: Typewriting.
3 5 9 10Several researchers ’ ’ ’ have studied disjunctive reactions, 
and obtained transmission rates by comparing disjunctive reaction times 
for disjunctions of different informational values. Typically, rates 
of about 10 bits/sec were found .
We made an experiment on disjunctive reaction times with the 
typewriter. Subjects had to type 1, 2, or 4 letters.22 Thus, this
study provided a bridge from single disjunctive reaction to the sequential
. . 21 activity previously studied
Two subjects took an average of .24 sec to respond if they knew 
which letter was coming . Typing a single unknown letter, selected 
at random from the whole alphabet, took .53 secj differences between 
letters were related to the position of the letter on the keyboard, but 
not to frequency of occurrence in English tests. With a set of 4 easy 
letters, the reaction time was less (.45 sec). However, when we used 
different tetrads of letters, and compared the reaction times with those 
found when the same letters occurred in a 26-letter experiment, we found 
that the gain in reaction time was only 3 - 9%. For alphabets of 8 and 
16 letters, the gain was negligible. On the other hand, increasing the 
alphabet to include numbers and symbols would result in much slower 
average reaction times. Thus, the limiting factors are range and speed, 
and not channel capacity.
* With one exception, where the rate was 22 bits/sec<12
** A third one took .14 sec, but she seemed not to wait until the letter 
was visible.
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Experiments with 2 and 4 unknown random letters (from the whole 
alphabet) produced a simple result: 
tn = 0.240 + 0.285n
where
n . . number of unknown letters
tn * • time from onset of display to execution of n’th letter (in 
seconds)
There are deviations from this rule which are statistically significant 
but small compared to the main effect.
Subjects make very few errors in this test. We credit them with 
4.5 bits per letter, and obtain an information flow of 4.5/0.285 = 16 bits/sec. 
This is considerably more than the values obtained in most tests of 
disjunctive reaction times. By manipulating the input probabilities we 
should be able to raise the transmission rate still a little higher.
The same Ss were asked to copy sequences of 200 random letters at 
high speed. In this test, they used about .30 sec per letter, or very 
slightly more than in the tests with 1-4 letters . Why this constancy 
of time? We surmise that it is due to habit. A typist entering the 
profession is supposed to write about 50 words per minute, which means 
about 270 msec per letter. This is her habitual speed and she will not 
utilize restrictions of the alphabet or of the length of the text to 
increase it.
This study shows up two effects of habit: high rate of information 
transmission and inflexibility of the activity pattern.
* The error rate was fairly high; T-values were from 10-16 bits/sec.
In earlier tests, where other subjects went through long practice 
sessions with long random sequences, we reached about 16 bits/sec.
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FACTORS LIMITING HUMAN INFORMATION TRANSMISSION 
The following is a brief descriptive catalog of factors which 
have been found to limit human capabilities of transmitting information. 
The list of categories is probably not comprehensive; neither is it 
orthogonal; it is nothing but a digest of experience up to this date.
a. Span for Simultaneous Activities
Man can attend to several activities simultaneously; it seems 
to be easier to do a little about several things than to do very much 
about a single one. But, when a single activity involves information 
processing at a high rate, then it effectively blocks other informational 
activities; witness the distracted professor. As far as we know, the 
only successful combination of activities was achieved by Licklider:^  
people can read incoherent words at about 25 bits/sec, and point at 
successive targets at about 15 bits/sec; if words are written across 
the targets, then the two activities can be performed at an almost 
additive rate of about 35 bits/sec.
The restriction on simultaneous activities applies to conscious 
information processing only; it does not apply to the total interaction 
of an organism with his surroundings, still less to the totality of 
all information-processing in a living organism.
b. Speed
We view information processing as a sequence of discrete decision 
processes; the unit acts can be performed effectively only up to a 
certain limiting speed. This speed is independent of the information 
content per act, within certain limits imposed by limited channel
capacity on one hand, by the simple challenge effect on the other.
c. Logon Content
Tasks involving the same amount of information transmission can be
set up in different ways, with results which are not psychologically
equivalent. For instance, the task of locating a dot on a scale with 64
intervals is informationally equivalent to that of locating the dot on
a 8 x 8 checkerboard. Psychologically, the two tasks are of very
different difficulty; the two-dimensional task is much easier.
14We adopt MacKay"s term "logon content" to describe the number of
different kinds of information contained in a unit . It is important to
realize that number and kind of logons are not properties of a given
situation but functions which depend on the mode of representing it. Thu
in psychological recognition tests, the logons used by the experimenter
to construct a display are not necessarily those which the subject uses
for recognition. So, we do not have reliable estimates of the human 
11 17 18logon capacity 5 5
The limitation on logon content for simultaneous display is called,
16with George A. Miller , the "span of perceptual dimensionality"; for 
presentation sequential in time, the "span of immediate memory". Both 
spans include usually about 7 logons.
d. Amount of Information per Logon
The informational capacity per logon per unit act is called the
g
"span of absolute judgment" . It ranges from 2.3 to 3.2 bits. Spans of 
double size are found in some cases.
* Other terms used; order of complexity, numerosity, dimensionality 
number of elements, of aspects, of attributes, of degrees of freedom.
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One gets different limiting values (or spans) depending on whether 
most of the challenge is in a single mode, or in two modes simultaneously„ 
Thus far, no experiments have been done (as far as we know) where the 
subjects were challenged in three or more modes simultaneously. We 
suspect that further lowering of the limiting values would result.
e. Filtering and Organization of Information Processing
If the informational challenge crowds or overtaxes a man8 s 
information-handling capabilities, then it might be appropriate to 
improve the situation by re-organization. For instance, if the difficulty 
is one of speed, then it might be possible to so recode the information 
as to produce fewer chunks of greater information content. When 
recoding promises no help, then one might select pieces of information 
according to their value. These activities involve information-processing 
If they must be done at a time of informational stress, then they cannot 
be very effective. Faced with two strong a flow of information, man 
can filter and recode up to a certain degree; soon he switches to 
random sampling of information, and from there to complete confusion 
is but one step.
f. Channel Capacity
With piano playing, we found a limiting transmission rate of about
22 bits/sec. For reading, Licklider found a peak rate of about 25
bits/sec with random sequences of words; for coherent English text,
21we found about 24 bits/sec . Data on ’’lightning calculators", under 
some plausible assumptions on their mode of procedure, indicate that
* " ~  '  23 — — ------------—Richards and Swaffield mention a higher value, but only as an
upper bound.
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21they process information at 24 bits/sec . Informal estimates of the rate 
of information transmitted by a good proof reader, and by a good tennis 
player, gave the same result, about 25 bits/sec25. We are inclined to 
believe that we are dealing with an invariant, characteristic of single 
over-learned activities, near-optimum conditions, and performance times 
of the order of minutes or seconds.
There are a number of experiments in the literature where transmission 
rates were measured under obviously sub-optimal conditions, and rates of 
much less than 20 bits were observed. This needs no explanation.
OUTLOOK
The methodology of the study of human channel capacity contains 
elements of the methodologies of time-motion studies, of psycho-physics, 
and of communication theory. Its specific traits are due to 5 effects;
(i) The non-stationarity of human behavior; this makes it necessary 
to use small samples, to short-cut methods, and to investigate confidence 
intervals;
(ii) Multiplicity of limiting factors; the informational capacity 
may be limited by one or more of several factors. In general, optimum 
performance occurs when there is a balanced challenge in several modes 
(such as speed, logon content, information per logon, etc). This effect 
calls for the investigation of a wide variety of conditions.
(iii) The simple challenge effect; the performance with respect 
to one particular factor is best if the informational challenge in the 
other factors is minimized; however, the total transmission is not as
good as with a balanced challenge. Experiments in psychological laboratories 
tend to be of the simple-challenge type, and their results are not indicative
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of the behavior at optimum transmission.
(iv) The confusion effect: it prevents measuring informational 
capabilities simply by using very large amounts of input information; 
one has to investigate a large range of informational challenges to 
find the peak transmission value;
(v) The force of habit: it causes high transmission values and 
low flexibility. Because of the first effect, one will do well to 
study well-habituated activities; because of the second, one must adjust 
his experiments to the habitual pattern if he wants to avoid spurious 
results.
With proper methods one can measure amounts of information 
processed in many simple tasks, ranging from laboratory experiments to 
every-day activities. What benefits can be expected from such measurements? 
The application to human engineering is obvious, particularly if it 
should turn out that human information transmitting can be described by 
a limited number of invariants.
The following values begin to look like invariants:
(i) Maximum amount of information of a single kind, in a single
chunk - about 2 1/2 bits (about 1 bit more if there is no other informational 
challenge, about 5 bits in particular highly skilled performances).
(ii) Maximum amount of information of all kinds in a single unit 
or "chunk", (e.g., assimilated in a glance) - about 20 bits.
(iii) Highest transmission rate for single activities, sustained 
for periods of the order of minutes, without interruption - about
25 bits/sec. !
(iv) Admissible number of logons in a unit - about 7.
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In some cases it is possible to give detailed specifications of 
components of an "equivalent information network" which reproduce certain 
aspects of human behavior. For instance, the detailed results of the 
scale-reading experiments outlined above suggest the following model:
"The limiting component is a temporary storage device 
which accepts information from the retina at a very high 
rate, and can be read out about every .15 sec. It has 
one storage compartment for general use, with an information 
capacity of 2.5 bits and 6 compartments for storage of 
information associated with single logons (or sub-units) 
of these, 4 have a capacity of 1.7 bits and 2 of 1.0 bit 
each. (Number and information capacities of the compartments 
are preliminary estimates) The single-logon compartments 
are filled in order to preference, with excess information 
spilling into the common compartment; all information 
components compete equally for the common compartment."
25
This model makes detailed predictions of information transmission 
in scale reading: the total transmission should be 4.2 bits for 1 scale, 
5.9 bits for 2, 7.6 bits for 3 and 9.3 bits for 4 scales, equally divided 
(which makes the bits per scale decrease from 4.2 to 3.0 to 2.5 to 2.3). 
If two more scales are added, they should transmit together 2.8 bits, 
but the transmission for each of the other 4 scales should be reduced by 
.2 bits, due to competition for the "general" compartment; thus the total 
transmission increases by only 2.0 bits. Another two scales should 
transmit .6 bits, but these will all come out of the other scales, so 
that the total transmission remains the same. The experimental results 
conform in great detail with these numbers. Furthermore, the model can 
be adjusted to the results of a large experiment in letter recognition 
simply by multiplying all information capacities by the factor 1.67.
With a minor additional adjustment, it predicts the results of extensive 
experiments with playing card recognition1. So, the "perceptual-daisy" 
is entitled to be taken seriously.
Models and invariants belong in pure psychology. It seems that 
not only the general concepts of information theory, but also the 
actual results of information measurements have their place both in pure 
and in applied psychology. One restriction must be kept in mind: 
information measurements are taken at the input and output terminals of 
a black box" - no matter whether these boundaries are at the skin or 
at the interphase between electrodes and tissue, deep inside the nervous 
system. By their very nature, information measurements are not concerned 
with mechanisms of information-processing, but with the results of such
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mechanisms. Their function is to establish conditions with which 
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Postscript: All experimental studies agree that man can transmit 
less than 50 bits per second and assimilate less than 25 bits per glance. 
These numbers appear very low to many people. Some people point to the 
fact that a telephone channel has to carry about 2000 bits per second, 
and a television channel has to have a much higher capacity, in order to 
be considered acceptable; others point out that in visual observation 
or even in just casual looking we seem to be aware of many more details 
than can be represented in 25 bits of information per glance.
The first argument is easily disposed of. Tele-communication 
channels are not built for use by a single person but have to satisfy 
simultaneously the requirements of many persons who direct attention to 
different parts of the transmitted information. Furthermore, the encoding 
and decoding procedures are clearly not maximally efficient as far as 
human information transmitting is concerned. If we knew more about the 
mechanisms by which man acquires information and if we were willing 
to establish very complex encoding and decoding devices, then we should 
be able to reduce the bandwidths of tele-communication equipment very 
considerably.
It is more difficult to dispose of the second argument, the appeal 
to daily experience of gathering enormous amounts of information through 
the eyes and ears. If this experience is real then we will have to 
conclude that our experimental methods simply do not grasp the full range 
of human information processing power. This is a possibility; we prefer 
to accept the alternative hypothesis, that the activities which have been 
tested experimentally are not far from optimum, and that the personal 
experience of gathering large amounts of information is a spurious one.
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This could be tested; one way of doing it, for instance, would be to 
present to observers complicated visual displays (not symbolic displays 
but pictures of actual landscapes with objects in them), and test the 
ability of observers to find certain details and see how much "noise" 
can be introduced without their noticing it. This test has not been made, 
but I expect that it would reveal that a large amount of changes can be 
introduced unnoticed by an observer. Against the daily experience of our 
finding a small object in a complex display, we would like to place the 
equally frequent experience of our not seeing something which is right 
in front of us if it is not in the place where we expect it to be.
We claim that man’s subjective experience of his own information­
processing is coded in such a way as to lead to a vast overestimate of 
the amounts of information actually processed. But what we actually see 
is a very rough picture with a few spots in.clear detail. What we feel 
we see is a large picture which is everywhere as clear in detail as the 
one favorite spot on which we concentrate our attention. Roughly 
speaking, the area of clear perception includes less than 1% of the 
total visual field and carries probably more than half of the total 
amount of information assimilated in a glance. If information 
assimilation would be equally successful over the whole visual field, then 
of course the total amount of information assimilated would go up by 
two or three orders of magnitude. I do not believe this to be the case.
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THE INFORMATIONAL LIMITATIONS OF DECISION MAKING
For the last three years, my associates and I have been busy 
studying the channel capacity of human beings. That is, we have tried to 
learn how many bits per second can be squeezed through a man under optimum 
conditions. One of these conditions is that transmitting information 
take the form of simple activities such as copying random sequences of 
letters, recognizing positions of pointers on dials, etc. This is a 
fascinating occupation, but we did not pursue it for its own sake. We 
were committed to do systems research, and from this point of view it is 
sufficient to know that human channel capacity is pathetically small, and 
that one should never use man in doing a mechanical job of transmitting 
information unless a better transducer is absolutely not available. In 
this sense, it is hardly necessary to have precise information on just 
exactly how low man's channel capacity is, and what factors make it so low. 
But, there is a reason why detailed studies of the informational capabilities 
of man can be of great importance to system research. The reason is that 
these limitation are operative in the performance which is most eminently 
man's special function in all large systems, namely, the making of 
decisions.
Making of Decision and Transmitting of Information 
It is not immediately obvious that the making of decision and the 
transmitting of information are one and the same activity. That they are 
will become clear if we analyze the process into its components. In the 
decision process, a situation is registered; it is evaluated according to
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some sets of principles; as a result of the evaluation, an action is 
selected and executed. Random elements may affect each and every one of 
the three basic components: the gathering of information, the evaluation 
of the situation, and the selection and execution of an action. In 
transmitting information, an input is recorded; a code book is consulted; 
as a result, an output is selected and executed. Again, all three phases 
of the process are subject to random processes, called "noise".
The fact that decision-making and information-transmitting are studied 
by separate people in separate laboratories is just a consequence of 
emphasizing different aspects of the same process. Students of decision­
making are interested in the rules which are used to select a given action 
in response to a given situation. The study may be a normative one, the 
problem being which outputs to choose if inputs and values are given. In 
other cases, the study is inductive, departing from inputs and outputs and 
trying to establish the system of values. Both studies are concerned with 
the motivational aspect of decision processes. Great care is taken not to 
have the process disturbed by informational limitations; one usually attempts 
to represent the situation with lucidity, to give the subject ample time 
and facilities to arrive at his decision, and to arrange a simple set of 
actions from which to select; in fact, in a large number of studies the 
range of possible actions is reduced to two. If one studies the informational 
aspect of decision processes, then one takes equally good care that there 
should be no doubt about what rules ought to be applied, and no difficulty 
in actually applying them; inputs and outputs are selected so as to give 
maximum transmission rates and this, in man, means always a choice between
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more than two alternatives.
There are good reasons why the motivational and informational aspects 
of decision processes are studied separately; but, it will be profitable 
for both groups of students to establish a solid connection before they 
drift too far apart. Most actual instances of making decisions and 
transmitting information are bound to lie between the two extremes 
preferred for laboratory investigations. As a rule, input information 
is presented in a large variety of modes, and with very different degrees 
of lucidity. The choice of an output can be highly specific or vague, 
it can be final or subject to modifications. The decision rules to be 
used can be selected from a large variety of possible strategies; there 
are few cases where a man will be absolutely certain which strategy to 
choose, and still fewer in which he has both the time and the skill to 
search for the optimum strategy. A man weaving his way through traffic 
on a busy road bases his decisions on as much information as he can 
gather and evaluate in the limited time available. His behavior will 
be between that of a laboratory subject in an experiment on decision 
making, and that of a laboratory subject in an experiment on information 
transmission. The typical situation of a man in a large man-machine 
system is analogous to that of a driver in heavy traffic; it is this 
kind of behaviour which we should want to know about, rather than the 
simplified types of behaviour which lend themselves best to study in the 
laboratory.
Situation, Decision-maker and Choice 
The outcome of a decision process depends on the situation which 
calls for a decision and on the individuality of the decision-maker.
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Let us consider a set of decision-makers, .a set of situations,.with which 
they may be faced, and a set of possible actions from which they may 
select. ALL selection processes will be broken up into atomic units. 
These units can be divided into five classes by the standard procedure 
of multi-variate analysis:
(i) selections which are characteristic of a particular situation - 
that is, selections which, given the situation, would have been made by 
all decision-makers,
(ii) selections which are characteristic of a particular decision­
maker - actions which he may take regardless of the situation,
(iii) the region of overlapping of the first two classes - such 
selections which any decision-makers would make in the particular 
situation, and the particular decision-maker in any situation,
(iv) selections which are characteristic of a particular decision­
maker in a particular situation,
(v) "spontaneous" selections, made for no recognizable reason, 
and considered as resulting from a random process (this may mean that 
the selection is truly unpredictable, or that a prediction is not made 
because of lack of knowledge or lack of interest).
The 5 classes of selections are graphically represented in Fig. 1.
The line x represents the set of all situations under consideration, 
the set of decision-makers, and z the repertoire of possible decisions; 
dots and arrows which connect them represent particular unit processes:
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Decision processes are part of the activity in which a system copes 
with its surroundings. The value of each decision to the system can be 
assessed in terms of how far it helps it to interact with the surrounding. 
It is possible that a particular random choice (class v) is so lucky 
that it makes the system highly successful, but this is not very likely; 
it will be very unlikely if the system and its tasks are very complex. 
Also, it is quite possible that a particular decision-maker is so 
brilliant that his selections are favorable even if they are done 
without taking account of the situation present (class ii minus class iii) 
but this is not very probable either - again, the less so the greater the 
variety of tasks which the system has to perform. The valuable decisions 
are bound to be those in classes i and iii (depending on the situation 
alone) and iv (due to a complementary effect of situations and decision 
maker). In other words, the valuable decisions are bound to be those 
in which the selection contains some information about the situation 
which has evoked the decision process.
We may replace the unit selections by an equivalent set of binary 
choices between equiprobable possibilities. This substitution yields
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automatically the informational analysis of a decision process. Let x, the 
input, the decision-maker, and z_y the output, be nodes in a tri-variate 
information network, and H(x), H(y), and H(z) the uncertainties associated 
w^th these three variables. Then, the amount of information transfer 
associated with selections in the first class (selections predictable on 
the basis of the input alone) is T(x;z), the information transmission 
between input and output. The selections of the second class produce an 
information transmission between decision-makers and output of the amount 
T(y;z). Class iii represents redundant, and class iv complëmentary 
informational relations in the system; the two can not be separated; their 
difference is the trivariate function
A(x;y;z) = T(x,y;z) - T(x;z) - T(y;z).
Finally, the informational value of spontaneous selections is H (z) orxy ' ’
the conditional uncertainty of the choice if both situation and decision­
maker are known.
It is seen that there exists no information function which corresponds 
to the aggregate of the three "useful" categories i, iii and iv. One 
restriction can remedy this situation: the personal idiosyncrasies of a 
particular decision-maker faced with a particular situation (class iv) mdy 
be of importance, but a large system does not have very much tolerance for 
individual differences. In this case, we are left with classes i and iii; 
this means that we have a situation where the informational value of useful 
decisions will be equal to T(x;z) - that is, the information transmitted 
by all those decision processes which arrive at a selection in response to 
the situation in a manner not dependeiit on the particular decision-maker.
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the system; a new proposition is substituted for the previous one that there 
might be a hostile aircraft. This "newness" is one of three kinds:
(i) the situation might be such that the recipient of 
the message knew that the statement was inevitable - in 
which case his amount of information has not been changed;
(ii) a particular recipient of the message did not 
have all the information needed to predict the decision, 
but this information existed elsewhere in the system; in 
this case, the message contains no information which is 
new to the system as a whole, but gives new information to 
some particular recipient;
(iii) something about the message (its content or its 
timing) could not have been predicted anywhere in the system, 
in which case truly new information has been generated. It 
is important to realize that this new information comes from
the officer, not from the target. On the other hand, information 
concerning the target has been destroyed, namely, the 
possibilities that it might be a friend or an innocent bystander.
Another example: a base is attacked by a large number of enemies, 
more than it can defend against simultaneously. The evaluation officer 
has the task of selecting those enemies which represent the most immediate 
threats and should be dealt with first. There are very many factors which 
go into threat evaluation. In the face of a manifold attack, it is likely 
that the evaluation officer will not have all these factors available 
to make his decision; even if he had them, he will hardly have the time 
to properly weigh them against each other. In this dilemma, he might
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decide to select a simple rule such as: "The most urgent threat is that 
enemy which approaches fastest". Accordingly, he will request estimates 
of the radial velocities of all enemies, find them greatest in, say, 
targets no. 5 and 17, and come up with the statement: "Targets number 5 
and 17 are the most immediate threats". This is new information; in
his selection might not have been quite predictable by an observer 
who had complete knowledge of the outside situation. Another officer, or 
even the same officer at some time, might have adopted slightly different 
rules of threat evaluation. Furthermore, the rules may not have been 
applied perfectly; mis-information or mis-calculation might have lead 
to a selection of two targets which are not actually those with the 
highest radical velocities. Thus, the whole system may have acquired 
some information which did not exist before - but it is precisely the 
fraction of information which is not coherent with objective 
properties of the targets. On the other hand, the system probably has 
lost some information in the course of decision process. It is not 
unlikely that information was available which could or should have 
modified the threat evaluation; this information will not be utilized 
after the evaluation has been made, and is therefore obsolete and dead.
These two examples illustrate the general situation: each decision­
making center gathers information from outside sources, in the f o r p  of 
situations reports, and from inside sources, in the form of decision 
rules, operating procedures, hunches, etc. On the basis of this 
information, an action is generated. This action usually contains new 
information. It may be locally new or wholly new. In the latter case, 
the "new" fraction of information is not related to the input and,
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therefore, likely to be of little value to the system. On the other hand, 
the information which has gone into the decision process has become largely 
obsolete and useless. Some of it might be needed for use in a subsequent 
decision process, but even then, it will often be easier to gather new 
information than to resurrect old data.
Complex Decision Systems
As a rule, important decisions concerning large systems are arrived 
^  after a long sequence of intermediate decisions. Many decision processes 
yield as outputs not actions but inputs to subsequent decision processes; 
and, higher decisions use as inputs not direct data but the outputs of 
earlier decision processes. This has two disadvantages. One is a loss 
of informational efficiency. The over-all performance of a system is 
represented only by that information which flows all the way through from 
the input to the output side. Information transmission between elements 
on the same level will be necessary to coordinate their decisions; 
information feedback from higher to lower levels will be needed ¿i^ r the 
same purpose. However, those chunks of information are utilized and die 
within the system; they do not appear in the over-all effect. The more 
complex the organization and the more internal traffic of information is 
needed, the less will be the utilization of the informational capacity 
of the system components. Furthermore, the decision process is inherently 
"noisy". Each intermediate decision is liable to obliterate some input 
information and keep it from ever going into the final decision process.
Even if each intermediate decision-maker is working according to well- 
established rules and doing his work efficiently and with a minimum of 
errors, his judgment is still restricted by the fact that his knowledge
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is localized; what appears to him irrelevent may be extremely important 
from a wider point of view. The longer the chain of intermediate decisions, 
the more complex the interplay of decision centers which finally lead up 
to the over-all decision, the greater the chance that relevant information 
wi-H be lost and that the final decisions will depend much more on the 
properties of the system itself than on the requirements. In informational 
terms, a sequence of intermediate decisions is a string of noisy channels 
coupled in series; in such a situation, little information is transmitted, 
and the final output has little to do with the initial input. This is 
not necessarily bad; a system might be so good that it performs well regard­
less of the outside situation - but for this the system must be extremely 
good or extremely lucky.
From these considerations one will deduct the postulate that one 
should postpone all decision-making until the need for a decision 
becomes imperative. This is precisely the point where informational 
limitations come in. A device equipped with a very large memory and 
enough speed to go through a very large number of operations within 
the time available, could afford to base its decisions on a very large 
amount of data. Man is no such device. He may base a decision on 
consideration of enormous amounts of data, but he can not do so in a 
single act. In each single decision process, there must be one instant 
when all the input data, all the rules applied, and all outputs under 
consideration are present simultaneously in such a fashion that they 
are available to conscious information processing. We have made no 
special studies on the informational limitations of complex decision 
processes. We may assume, however, that the types of informational
42
limitations which have been found in simpler processes will also occur in 
more complex processes. If so, then a single decision can take into account 
only a limited number of elements (logons); the amount of information in 
each element will be limited (span of absolute judgment); the total amount 
information in all logons will be limited (channel capacity); and the 
time will have both a lower and an upper limit, the latter imposed by 
forgetting. Furthermore, it seems safe to assume that the Simple Challenge 
Effect applies; that is, if a decision involves very few elements, then the 
amount of information for these elements can be greater than if there are 
many elements involved. Also, and this is very important, it seems to be 
certain that the Confusion Effect applies, that is, if the informational 
content of a decision processes becomes very much higher than capacity, 
confusion results and the final selection is made randomly, and is not 
coherent with the situation.
We have summarized our investigations on the informational limitations 
of a unit perceptual process by the crude picture of a daisy (Fig. 2).
It is thought of as a storage device; the number of petals represents the 
limitation on logon content, the size of the petals and the heart, the 
limitations on information content of the components, and the over-all 
area, the channel capacity. The decision process, too, depends on the 
concrescence into a unit of information concerning inputs, outputs, and 
rules. This unit - be it ever so fleeting - must be stored somehow. The 
storage device can be symbolically represented by a "decisional daisy", 
probably similar to the "perceptual daisy" although it might be more
c omp 1 ex.
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Fig. 2 Symbolic Representation of a Unit Decision Process
The informational limitations are a very good reason why we must 
make intermediate decisions. If decisions are postponed until the 
input information gathered surpasses the informational capacity of a 
unit decision process, then confusion will result, a random selection 
will be made and much input information will be lost. In this sense, 
the evaluation officer in our example performs a service to the system 
even if he is wrong. His statement "targets nos. 5 and 17 are the most 
immediate threats" may be mistaken, it may kill off valuable information; 
but, it converts a mass of information which is so large that it is 
certainly useless into a piece of information of manageable size which 
may be useful.
We have derived two contradictory postulates: the number of decision 
centers or decision processes in a complex system should be small so
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as not to lose input information and waste information capacity, and it 
should be large in order to avoid the confusion effect. The design of a 
complex system will involve a compromise between these two postulates. 
However, knowledge available at this time is not sufficient to pinpoint 
optimum designs; we cannot do more than point out a principle.
We started out with the statement that each decision process has a 
motivational and an informational aspect. The motivational aspect is treated 
by most present studies of decision making, including the applications of 
game theory. These studies have been very successful in some ways, and 
not very successfully in others. The application of information theory 
allows one to make use of an entirely different aspect of decision-making, 
and it is suggested that this application might lead to important results 
in the science of organization and management.
